DECISION-MAKING IN CHINESE LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: PATH DEPENDENCE, AGENCY AND IMPLEMENTATION†

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SUMMARY

How do policy makers make up their minds? What goes into their calculations when deciding whether a proposed policy or reform measure should or should not be adopted? This article looks into these important, if mundane, questions by considering the case of recent decisions taken in relation to Chinese township reforms. It argues that, in this case, policy makers were inclined to focus on costs, and neglected the *potential* benefits of reform due to the past reform trajectory whereby most previous township reforms have failed. Furthermore, policy makers were predisposed to perceive most stakeholders as ‘resisters’ of change or passive beneficiaries. This article contemplates the possibility of improving decision-making capacity by recognising the agency role of ‘reform targets’. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

KEY WORDS — policy and decision making; China; township administrative reform; path dependence

INTRODUCTION

How do policy makers make up their mind as to whether or not a policy proposal should be adopted? What are the major considerations at work? The policy sciences literature, drawing on insights from diverse disciplines, has taken a somewhat eclectic approach to answering this question (including how this question is put). Various subgroups have placed emphasis on, for instance, conflict/power, learning, history, ideas and the role of policy implementation (Deleon and Martell, 2006; Pierre, 2006; Grin and Loeber, 2007), with each exhibiting various degrees of generality.1 The conflict/power model is the most commonly used approach. It sees policy making as the product, as well as manifestation, of the dominant power structure(s) and conflict contestations in the wider social and political systems, including the bureaucratic machinery wherein the deals are struck. Alternatively, those models that see policies as a product of learning generally adopt a more ‘rational’ view of decision making, though some policy learning theories also explicitly incorporate power contestations as part and parcel of the learning process (Bennett and Howlett, 1992). Policy learning theories also discuss the role of history in policy formulation, as history is implied in the concept of learning. What remains unclear is the kind of history that is relevant, the extent to which history is relevant and how exactly the past’s influence on the present and the future is affected (Hirsch and Gillespie, 2001). The implementation studies literature, on the other hand, has consistently argued that what is going to be implemented *will* have a major impact on what *was* (and will be) decided as a policy. The future, namely what is going to take place during the post-policy-formulation phase—the implementation process—will counteract the past and lead to, or constitute, *new* changes in policy (Winter, 2006).

This article focuses on the question of policy formation. It does so by examining the case of decision making in relation to the recent developments in Chinese township administrative reform. It suggests that the influence of past

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1Bennett and Howlett (1992: 288) and Winter (2006: 158) observe that many scholars on policy analysis have dwelt on developing general framework and models with little applicability and argue for the need for more empirical-based work.

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trajectory—that is, history of the reform—on subsequent decisions in the same policy domain is critical. In particular, the memories of failed reform attempts in the recent past have led to an inclination amongst policy makers to focus on costs of reform at the expense of potential benefits whilst considering new measures. At the same time, negative experiences also reinforced a predisposition, or a theory of agency, amongst central government actors (and also those at lower government levels) who tended to see stakeholders as either resisting change stubbornly or waiting to benefit from reform passively, rather than being capable of bringing about change and bearing risks as participative agents would do. In turn, this perception of how other actors may respond led national policy makers to adopt a passive stance, whereby they were reluctant to express explicit support to emerging local reform initiatives, let alone foster their successful implementation. History, learning, agency and implementation all played a role in policy making.

The main part of this article is divided into several sections. The next section outlines the trajectory of Chinese township administrative reform during the last two decades, including its wider contexts and remaining problems. Then the article discusses a critical juncture of decision making more recently to examine how decisions at the national level were made, or not made, despite a pressing need for change. By laying out how things have happened as they did, the article highlights the possibility for improved decision making—enhanced state capacity—via a heightened awareness and agency of the actors to act differently.

CHINESE TOWNSHIP ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: A TRAJECTORY OF FRUSTRATIONS

The Chinese township administrative reform seemed unable to make genuine progress despite repeated attempts to achieve change over the last two decades. Occupying the lowest level in the five-tiered Chinese government hierarchy, the township has been subjected to a series of cyclical downsizing and expansion as waves of national administrative reforms have come and gone. Township reforms started as early as 1986, two years after the township was established as a formal level of government. Then, the objective was to strengthen the structure and functions of the township government, and powers were decentralised from the counties. The expansion of government led, however, to a subsequent call for downsizing in the early 1990s, as reform shifted to the interface between government and enterprises in order to ‘claw back’ the reach of the government into the economy. Despite the rhetoric of economic reform calling for a smaller government, however, little was accomplished (Burns, 2003).

At local levels, there was a phenomenal increase in township personnel nationwide from the mid-1990s as local governments enjoyed increased discretion over recruiting additional workers, whom they paid with ‘informal’ local tax and fee incomes. Some efforts to downsize and contain the growth in staff were made in the late 1990s after the central government ordered, in 1998, the number of core central government staff to be reduced by one half within 3 years. Results have not been satisfactory, however. At the turn of the millennium, an average township government in central China was estimated to employ at least 350–550 salaried workers paid through various channels of public monies, as opposed to fewer than ten in the mid-1980s (Wu, 2006: 15–17).3

Explaining the failure of successive administrative reforms in the Chinese government requires a separate effort that is beyond the scope of this article. Indeed, one may deduce from the brief account above that the several rounds of reform since the 1980s were driven by different concerns and objectives. For instance, the reforms in the mid to late 1980s had township government expansion, not downsizing, as an intended objective. This was in contrast to administrative reforms in the early to mid-1990s, which were more motivated by a desire to speed up economic reform and growth. More recently, apparently similar downsizing reforms that were carried out after 2000 were

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2The township (rural; town for the urban equivalent) replaced the ‘commune’ in 1984 to become the lowest formal level of government in PRC, marking the end of the collectivisation period that had started in the mid-1950s. The five-tiers of government are central, provincial, prefectural/municipal, county and township. In 2006 China had a total of 34,675 townships, down 20% from 43,511 in 2000 due to mergers as a result of reform.

3The 350–550 salaried workers include civil servants, rural service workers and teachers (teachers usually accounted for more than half of the total).
driven by a fiscal crisis within the government, especially at the county and township levels. It therefore seems inappropriate to treat township government reforms as a single genre to be evaluated against one set of criteria.

Township governments have faced renewed pressure to restructure and downsize since 2000 as a result of the national policy of reducing state extraction in order to contain social discontent in the countryside (Bernstein and Lü, 2003; Li, 2006a). Under the national rural tax reform measures that were promulgated in 2000 and adopted nationwide since 2002–2003, county and township governments were deprived of their most lucrative sources of fiscal revenue. Staff pay had always accounted for the lion’s share of the meagre budgets of township governments (Yang, 2003; Chen, 2004; Ai and Zhou, 2007), and many turned to informal sources such as unauthorised fees and charges. From the perspective of the central government, however, cutting the cost of township government—which had daily, and direct, contact with rural residents—was instrumental in the success of its efforts to reduce rural taxes and ameliorate state–society tension.

It therefore came as no surprise that the central government explicitly required township governments to downsize by 20 percent in its 2000 plan to reform the rural tax regime (Li, 2006 A: Fig. 1). The saved staff costs were, according to the reform documents, to compensate for the shortfall of revenues subsequent to the reduced taxes. As these documents stated,

> After the implementation of the rural tax reform, the reduced revenues of county and township governments are to be met by a corresponding decrease in local expenditures through the following ways: adjusting the functions of the county/township government, streamlining government structure and organization, rationalizing the establishment of township government departments and service agencies, tightening up the management of personnel establishment and having more dual appointments of Party and government personnel (CCP Central Committee State Council, 2000).

The measures relied upon in this round of administrative reform were, however, no different from the previous rounds.4 Despite official reports claiming success, a decrease in staff numbers often did not imply any savings in total staff expenditures, largely because the reduction figures masked increases in personnel elsewhere in the public sector, and also because the downsizing measures called for new expenses as sweeteners (Burns, 2003; Li, 2006b). For instance, in one province, downsizing turned out to be largely rhetorical:

> During the five months of intensive downsizing ‘campaign’, the total number of township government bureaus in County A was reduced by 60 percent, from 160 to 64. Leadership positions (positions at the level of township heads and party secretaries, including deputies) went down by 17.4 percent from 482 to 398. The number of township service units was down to 202 from 339, and staff numbers down 65 percent from 2,195 to 770. These impressive figures however masked important continuities. The ‘outgoing’ leaders were merely given alternative job titles to produce a smaller statistic for the leadership positions, and all kept their original perks and pay levels in their new positions. Reductions in the number of units often meant the amalgamation of several units into one, with little change to the functions of the units and little done to reduce overlap of duties or improve efficiencies (Li and Wu, 2008: 148).

The central government, as the major driving force of successive downsizing reforms, has belatedly admitted that previous attempts to downsize government had not worked.

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4Since the 1990s, the main method of reducing the number of government employees who have not yet reached normal retirement age adopted since the 1990s has been so-called ‘streamlining’ [fen-liu], or literally diverting part of the water (the staff) into sub-streams (categories) so that the main stream has a reduced water flow volume. The diverted, or ‘streamlined’, employees are paid a portion (60–70%) of their basic salary for three years, during which time they are expected to settle in another job in the ‘market’. Their pay and employment relations with the government are to be terminated at the end of the 3 year transitional period.
The reality is, we have found out, after the three-year transitional period, the state coffers still have to pay the streamlined [fenliu] staff, though the original plan was to have zero staff costs by then. It is thus unrealistic to expect direct saving from reducing the number of serving staff (Author’s interviews, quoted in Li, 2006a: 70).

Yet new measures have been slow to materialise.

A LACK OF NEW INITIATIVES

It is perhaps plausible to surmise that there have been few policy innovations in administrative reform because there is, in fact, no strong demand for imminent change. Given the failures of previous administrative reforms, the Chinese Government has, apparently, yet to find the costs of failures ‘unbearable’. Burns (2003: 777) points out that the CCP has an entrenched interest in maintaining a high level of government employment and in rewarding supporters through providing state sector jobs. Whilst the logic of economic reform and fiscal pressures had demanded downsizing measures (out of a concern for cutting slack staff and raising labour productivity), the traditional need to maintain, if not expand, political patronage apparently pulled the party-state in a diametrically opposite direction and compromised its efforts in administrative reforms. Recent developments in township administrative reforms also appeared to lend support to this observation.

As mentioned above, township administrative reforms were included in the national rural tax reform package in order to keep local tax–fees at a low level. Many Chinese townships had relied on a variety of local fees and taxes to finance their core functions and staff bills, and abuses were common. A direct response of the central government, when it started to move to contain rural state extraction, was thus to constrain local staff growth and to cut down current staff levels, so that township governments would face less demand from within its workforce to increase local revenues to pay their wages. However, as explained above, downsizing proved to be tricky. If downsizing failed to save costs, then the central government would have to increase transfer payments to local governments in order to compensate for the shortfalls in local revenues which townships were now forbidden to collect. From 2002 onwards the central government had indeed done just that: central transfer payments specifically for this purpose reached RMB 24.5 billion, 54.6 billion and 78 billion in 2002, 2004 and 2006, respectively (Chen, 2003; Xianxiang caizheng, 2005; Jinnian, 2007). However, as the actual shortfall far exceeded the increase in incoming central transfers (Li, 2006b), and a substantial portion of the incoming monies from the central government failed to reach the township government owing to fund diversion and ‘taxing’ by intermediaries at provincial, municipal and county levels (Ou, 2008), many township governments faced immense difficulties in terms of continuing their normal operation and maintaining a minimal level of public services. There were reports of closures of local village schools in parts of China as early as 2003, and many township governments could not pay their staff on time and ran into new debts (Fan and Shi, 2005; Fagaiwei, 2006).

Faced with these problems, the central government was compelled to move beyond its original narrow focus on downsizing. Starting from 2003, official statements and policy documents have demanded efforts to be spent not only on administrative restructuring and downsizing, but also on adjusting the functions of township government, rationalizing public service agencies, and altering the state-market mix in public service provision in the countryside.5 In 2006 a decision was made to centralise the management of township finance at the county level, which was first piloted in Anhui Province, the birthplace of rural tax reforms, a few years ago (Wang, 2006). This development reversed the trend, in evidence since the mid-1980s, of strengthening the capacity of the township, to manage its budget independently. Apparently, since the township had been weakened during the rural tax reform as a result of the reduction in local revenues and government capacity, a judgment was reached at the higher levels that

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5This started from the promulgation of State Council Document No. 85 (2003) on 30 September 2003 (State Council General Office, 2003), which calls for adjustments to the township-county fiscal relations, an increase in downward transfer payments, and measures to secure the smooth operation of township and village-level agencies and service delivery.
further centralisation would help, not hinder. The relatively stronger county governments were to take up duties that were previously the responsibility of the township authorities, thus relieving some of the pressure on the latter.

Also in 2006, the State Council held a meeting at which it prescribed a three-pronged approach to deepening the administrative and organisational reforms in township governments. This consisted of, ‘adjusting the functions of the government (vis-à-vis enterprises and society), reducing government personnel and expenditures and strengthening rural administration and public service provision’ (Wen Jiabao, 2006). Despite these repeated calls for administrative reforms to go beyond a sole focus on downsizing, there was, however, a conspicuous absence of guidelines setting out specific measures. A State Council Document (State Council, 2006) issued a few months after the meeting, presumably designed to codify the meeting resolutions and to elaborate on implementation measures, also failed to offer any new measures.

**A LOCAL PROPOSAL**

A closer look reveals that the central government had been offered suggestions on township administrative reform from local governments but decided against their adoption. Discussing the local initiatives in this context presents us with a window into central government decision making. The relevant question, for our purposes, is not whether the central government *should* adopt a local proposal as a national policy, but *how* the central government arrives at a decision either way. What considerations have gone into the decision-making process?

Earlier it was noted that local governments were required to implement downsizing and restructuring. Most localities simply paid lip service and followed the traditional method of ‘streamlining’, with little impact. Hubei Province in Central China, on the other hand, experimented with a more radical approach by adjusting the state-market mix in rural public service provision in favour of the market. Government public service units (PSU) at and below the township level were abolished, and then re-established as non-state-owned service centres. These new units were then expected to function independently of the government, which could outsource specific public services to them through performance contracts. The quality of service was expected to improve, and it was expected that government staff costs would be reduced in the medium to long term, if not immediately (Li, 2008).

**Lacklustre central response**

Hubei started its reform with the policy of establishing township PSUs in some localities in 2003, and implemented it province-wide from 2005 to 2006. The main thrusts of reform—enhancing the role of the market in rural public service delivery as well as providing a new way of downsizing township government—appeared to be simply following through the call for ‘deepening’ reform contained in national policy documents. This appears to have contributed to the confidence amongst Hubei’s reformers that their initiative would, eventually, be adopted nationally (Author’s interviews, Hubei, 2004, 2006). However, when the State Council issued yet another directive on ‘rural comprehensive reforms’ in October 2006, not a single word in the Directive referred to Hubei’s PSU reform. This was despite the fact that one major emphasis of rural comprehensive reforms was to be, explicitly, township administrative reform. This conspicuous omission was generally interpreted by local government officials, and Hubei officials in particular, to mean that the central government had ‘cold-shouldered’, if not outright disapproved of, Hubei’s reform. The question remains: why was the central government not more positive towards Hubei’s reform given its repeated calls for new initiatives in township administrative reforms?

**Pre-occupation with costs**

As mentioned previously, there has been renewed pressure for local administrative reforms in the aftermath of the rural tax reform. A senior official in the central government in charge of administrative reform emphasised to the author at an interview that rural administrative reform was now a *must*:
Why do we need to reform township PSUs? Because the way they are used to operate no longer suits the needs of peasants and their super-ordinates at the upper levels in the current political circumstances, namely delivery of services! There has got to be change one way or the other (Author’s interview, Beijing, 2006).

Why was better delivery of rural public services important now, if not before? Another senior central official, who had played an active role in recent rural policy formulation, had this to say:

Since the outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003, public awareness of the importance of the narrowing urban-rural divide in public services has surged tremendously. It is now no longer a topic that is discussed and debated within elite circles only, but has become part of the public discourse. Urban residents now recognize that rural public service provision also affects their own safety and interests, not just the well being of their rural fellow citizens (Author’s interview, Beijing, 2006).

The problem was that the central government was uncertain about how to proceed with local administrative reform, despite a perceived need for it. When asked what problems the central government had found with Hubei township’s PSU reform, the central official in charge of administrative reform elaborated on the costs, and risks, that Hubei’s reform was likely to incur:

Hubei’s reform will require additional fiscal expenditures to pay for the ‘severance payments’ and associated costs for the laid off PSU staff, in order to mitigate resistance of the outgoing workers. However, first, it is unclear how much this bill will amount to. Hubei once mentioned 1.8 billion yuan. I have no clue as to how they arrived at this figure. In any event, the central government cannot be expected to foot the bills for excess staffing at local levels. Moreover, the central coffers have already increased transfer payments to local levels during the rural tax reform, and cannot afford to spend more on [the staff costs of rural] local governments (Author’s interview, Beijing, 2006).

Closely related to concerns about costs are reservations on feasibility, in other words doubts that the intended outcomes may materialise. There are two major uncertainties. The first is about whether Hubei’s reform can downsize government more effectively than more traditional methods. The second is whether the reform can effectively improve the quality of service delivery in the countryside.

First, the laid off staff may still refuse to leave government for good after they are paid the ‘severance payments’. If they fail to make a good living, or feel aggrieved for whatever reason, they may well demand to return to government ranks, as in the case of staff laid off through the traditional method of ‘streamlining’. The government will be under tremendous political pressure to take them back in. The chance of staff not seeking to return is contingent on many factors, the most important probably being economic—that is, whether they have successfully found a better job and improved their standard of living—rather than changes to arrangements of the laying off process, namely the differences between the traditional streamlining method and Hubei’s reform. If that is the case, why bother to pay more for the latter? Secondly, assuming that the PSUs are eventually converted to non-state-owned service centres, it is highly uncertain that these service centres are capable of delivering genuinely improved services to the rural population. The design of the reform will give an advantage to former PSU staff, relative to ‘outsiders’, in staffing these service centres [in order that the former PSU staff will not fiercely oppose the reform]. In that case, it is likely that there will be little market competition from the supply end. With more or less the same batch of people manning the ‘new’ service centres, it is questionable that services can be much better. In any event, there is likely to be a lack of alternative service providers with the required training in the countryside to compete with the former PSU workers. A de facto monopoly of services will not be conducive to service improvement. If the market is unlikely to be in place or to work, we shall still have to rely on more traditional methods, namely administrative supervision and monitoring, in order to maintain service standards. If that is the case, why take
the extra efforts to embark on Hubei’s reform, which, after all, is about introducing market forces to the government sector of rural public services? (Author’s interview, Beijing, 2006)

**Targets, not agents, of reform**

Fuelling, and mediating, the reservations described above is the dominant image amongst central and local officials of reform stakeholders as ‘targets’ of reform, rather than participative agents. PSU workers were, for instance, generally portrayed as those at the ‘receiving end’ of reform measures. Given their vested interests, they were expected to resist reform. Indeed this perception has even infiltrated ‘reformers’ in Hubei, where township government officials often referred to PSU workers, and indeed themselves, as ‘targets of reform’ in day-to-day conversations. Similarly, peasants were generally regarded as passive recipients of government services who may welcome or resist reform but who were not capable of contributing to it. During interviews, officials often made remarks about the attitudes of peasants towards reforms. A Hubei county level leader once said,

‘Since 2002 our rural tax reform has substantially reduced peasants’ burden, but peasants still hold a different attitude [they remain unsatisfied]. We’d better cut taxes down to one cent, and even distribute monies to them!... We keep the interests of the peasants in mind all the time in designing reforms. ...however, peasants don’t feel gratified yet. For example, now we no longer demand water fees, but they want even more benefits!’ (Author’s interview, Hubei, 2004)

In the eyes of officials across different levels, peasants were merely recipients of government policy. Worse still, peasants were critical. Whilst officials were adamant about their concern for peasants’ interests, and often complained of the difficulty of satisfying their ‘insatiable’ wants, they had applied relatively little thought as to how to incorporate peasants into the process of reform itself in order to make things work.

For instance, the market emphasis of Hubei’s PSU reform called for the systematic collection of user feedback in order that the township government may adequately monitor the delivery of services. In practice, the participation of peasants in reform appeared to be very limited. Notwithstanding the official requirement, local officials had little to tell the author when asked about how they obtained feedback from peasants, suggesting their lack of consideration, and even awareness, on the matter. Another indication of this lacklustre attitude towards peasant participation is related to a prescribed measure in the national rural tax reform on village fee collection. Village committees are required to convene general meetings of villagers to approve their spending plans before collecting any fees annually (Ministry of Agriculture, 2000). Intended to constrain excessive local taxes and fees through popular participation, this reform measure (in Chinese, yi-shi-yi-yi, meaning literally deliberation on each and every item)—a form of participatory budgeting at the most grassroots level, was severely criticised by local officials nationwide as unenforceable and undesirable, and has since remained largely on paper (Yang et al., 2005; Feng, 2008). Apparently, peasants are, as always, not expected to take any active, positive, role.

**CONCLUSION: MOVING BEYOND THE TRODDEN PATH?**

This article suggests that decision making in the Chinese administrative reforms has been heavily influenced by past reform trajectory. Previous negative experiences have led to an almost sole emphasis on costs when considering new reform measures. Despite repeated calls for new initiatives, policy makers often turned their back on proposals when they were put forward, leaving local experiments to ‘float or sink’ on their own.

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6 This is from my field observations in Hubei Province (2003–2006). See also Li and Yuan (2007)
7 Author’s field observations. On one occasion, even the main architect of Hubei’s PSU reform failed to give a response when being asked the responses of peasants to the reform (Author’s interview, Hubei, 2006).
8 See He and Thøgersen (2006) for a local experiment of participatory budgeting at the upper, township level.
There are, no doubt, good reasons for prudence. Indeed, still vivid memories of major policy disasters in the Maoist period suggest that it is wise to err on the conservative side. Adoption of a policy option is a serious matter, and conventional wisdom requires localities to prove their measures beyond reasonable doubt before national adoption. The trajectory of administrative reform in China suggests, however, that where interest contestation is intense and resistance to change entrenched in the dominant power structure, the taken-for-granted rule of proving feasibility from the bottom up becomes an elusive possibility in practice. What are apparently lost in the contemplation of actions within the central policy circle are the multitude of options in between the poles of adoption and negation.

To improve future decision-making, it may be advisable to obtain a broader view of the possibilities allowed by a local measure as well as to identify possible costs and sources of resistance. One possible route is through adjusting the dominant image of reform stakeholders and fostering more participation and collaboration amongst them. Indeed, a closer examination of the Hubei PSU reform implementation has revealed, tentatively, that the reform was able to go ahead because of the agency of PSU workers (Li and Yuan, 2007). Once the county and township leaders made clear their determination, as line managers at upper-level government, to convert the township PSUs into non-state-owned ‘market players’, a significant number of PSU workers were capable of coming to grips with the situation quickly, despite initial grudges. Furthermore, they took initiatives independently in order to make the new system work, and also to earn new revenues for themselves. Ideas mushroomed and new services were launched. If such initiatives come with the risk of new abuses (for instance possible diversion of public resources to ‘market’-based new services), the problem lies more in the shortfall of agency of the upper levels of adequate oversight (including the lack of measures allowing bottom-up monitoring), than in the passivity of the ‘targets of reform’.

Bremer (1984) argues that, in seeking to develop the capacity of policy analysis, it is futile to focus on the institutional, or ‘internal’, capacity in most developing countries, given the many limitations in the organisation, culture and sheer resource levels in developing countries. The gap is simply too large to be ‘fillable’, and the task too complex and embedded to be disentangled. Instead, she suggests an alternative strategy to improve policy analysis through building ‘process capacity’. Simply put, it involves getting other actors and organisations outside the traditional circle of government policy analysts to conduct policy analysis for the consideration of the policy makers. The task of developing the government’s capacity of policy analysis thus becomes one of developing the capacity of the government to identify suitable external agents to conduct the analysis, and to critically appreciate and make use of the analysis during the formulation and adjustment of policies. Zhu and Xue (2007)’s discussion of Chinese policy think tanks points to the beginning of such a process of developing the ‘process capacity’ in contemporary China.

This article suggests that the processes of building ‘process’ and ‘internal’, institutional, capacities for policy analysis are not exclusive to one another. ‘External’ agents of analysis and, indeed, of execution, need first to be ‘recognised’, and appreciated, before their analysis can ever be ‘made use of” by ‘internal’ policy makers during the decision-making process. Otherwise their very existence, as co-analysts of policy, may not even be taken note of. This calls for the development of the capacity of the ‘internal’ actors to see the roles of, and respond to, the ‘external’ actors appropriately—as partners in the process of policy analysis and deliberation. In addition, the constitutive role of policy implementation in policy analysis, as this article has highlighted, points to the presence of a pool of policy analysts within the policy circle, namely the implementers at the various government levels. There is, in other words, no shortage of agency and analysis capacity within the existing system, if only it is given its due recognition.

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